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1Concepts of need in housing allocation
Paul Spicker
Department of Social Studies
Trent Polytechnic
Published in Policy and Politics, vol 15 no. 1, 1987, pp 17-27.  
Abstract.  Policies for the allocation of council housing are subject to considerable local
variation.  Despite the differences, the schemes which housing departments have developed
seem often to reflect a common understanding of the concept of 'need'.  Their emphasis is on
an individual, material, absolute idea of 'need' which depends strongly on conventional
interpretation to determine what is included and what is not.  The values expressed in explicit
policies form part of an ideology of need, in the sense that they constitute an inter-related set
of ideas commonly shared within a profession.  This ideology is based less in the
implementation of common principles than the constraints of practice.    
2
The concept of 'need' is of great importance in the distribution of social services, but one which
has proved difficult to analyse in specific practical contexts.  Some elegant theoretical
constructs have been raised to examine the idea.  Bradshaw's 'taxonomy of social need' (1972)
distinguishes four categories.  Normative need is a set level of need,  defined by experts. 
Comparative need is determined by comparison with the standards of others.  Expressed need
is expressed by clients, or consumers, themselves; and felt need is experienced, but not
necessarily expressed, by the same people.  The taxonomy raises the question whether needs
can be considered to be set, or 'absolute', or whether it must be seen relative to other needs. 
Another issue is whether need should be defined by the professional or the consumer.  These
are important problems; Bradshaw's taxonomy has been a useful analytical tool.  However, as
Clayton (1983) points out, it fails to identify classes of need precisely enough to make it
possible to use it directly in practice.  It is not clear how the concepts he outlines might be
operationalised - that is, translated into terms which are measurable and applicable to the
actual circumstances of social services.  Smith's (1980) analysis of social need - derived from
empirical analysis of the work of Social Services departments - points to further dimensions,
including the questions whether the needs of individuals, families or communities should be
the focus of policy, and the influence of moral judgements about clients on definitions of need. 
These are useful insights, but taken as general propositions they make it difficult to think in
terms of specific criteria for distribution.
Nevitt (1977) argues that the idea of 'need' is effectively redundant.  Economic analyses
(Williams, 1974; Culyer, 1976) have attempted to treat need as a special form of demand. 
Unlike demand, 'need' does not apparently fall when costs increase; the concept of need, to
be used in this way, must then be treated as a condition which is liable to be met subject to
cost.  On this basis, Hill and Bramley argue that 'need' can be assessed within the framework
of cost-benefit analysis.  But this begs the question of how the benefits of meeting need are
to be assessed, and they admit that "in the practical world the difficulties of operationalising
this approach should not be underestimated" (1986, pp.73-74).  This is a major weakness in the
approach: if 'need' is to be used as a meaningful criterion for distribution, it has to be
describable in terms which can be applied to the actual circumstances of social services.
This paper examines the concepts of 'need' that apply within a specific applied context
- the allocation of public housing in Britain.  Although its numbers have been reduced in recent
years, council housing still accounts for well over a quarter of all the housing in Britain.  Initially,
it was intended to provide for the 'working classes', a term removed from the legislation in
1949, and subsequently it expanded on a universal basis; but its role has shifted, leading to
discussion of public housing as a 'residual' service, providing for those most in need.  (see
Forrest, Murie, 1983)  In this context, 'need' has become an increasingly important constituent
of claims for public housing.  Most housing authorities recognise need as a legitimate criterion
on which houses may be allocated, and politically there is strong pressure to take greater
account of it: 'councils', Shelter argues, 'should let their houses to the people in greatest need.'
(Noel Dolan, cited in Inside Housing, 1986)  
There is substantial variation between the schemes used for allocation; public housing
is locally controlled, and one would not expect all local authorities to apply the same criteria. 
There are differences of political viewpoints about the importance of certain factors, such as
problems which are liable to lead to homelessness, and differences of opinion about how to
respond to poor physical and environmental conditions.  There are large differences between
needs in local authority areas, and different levels of demand for council housing.  In one place,
most of the housing may be substantially improved, with little or no housing with inadequate
amenities; in another, a large number of old houses may have been built to a similar standard,
and now have little to choose between them.  However, despite the differences, there are also
some striking likenesses between the schemes operated by different authorities.  If there are
reasons why Carlisle and Waltham Forest, Norwich and Eastbourne, or Enfield and Preseli (in
Pembrokeshire) should operate apparently similar schemes, they are not self-evident.  In 1982,
I conducted a comprehensive national survey of schemes published by local authorities.  (The
details of this survey appeared in The allocation of council housing, Spicker, 1983).  The
published material is often obscure, and important aspects are not open to public examination. 
But from the information that is available, and from my own experience - as a Lettings Officer
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responsible for allocations, and from subsequent research, consultancy, and discussions with
practitioners - it is possible to make certain generalisations about the process involved.  
There are four main stages in allocations.  Firstly, applicants have to be admitted to the
list.  There may be restrictions on the basis of age, where one lives, or present tenure.  Some
applications lie dormant even once they are admitted.  (This stage is discussed in Matthews,
1983.)  Secondly, applications have to be categorised into groups, according to the location and
the type of accommodation they are being considered for (see, e.g., Flett et al., 1979; Simpson,
1981).  Thirdly, priority has to be determined between applicants.  Virtually all authorities have
some scheme whereby priority groups - like homeless people or medical cases - are treated
differently from other applications.  Priority within groups is then decided by one of three
systems: 'merit', or discretion; date order; or points, in which applications are assessed and
weighed according to certain previously defined criteria.  (see CHAC, 1969; Niner, 1975;
Gregory, 1975; Winyard, 1978)  Finally, applicants have to be matched to specific property. 
This may involve discussion about preferences, (Clapham, Kintrea, 1986) the grading of
applicants by their standards of housekeeping (Duke, 1970; Damer, Madigan, 1974; Gray,
1976), or perhaps a further consideration of cases on a discretionary basis (English et al. 1976;
Lewis, 1976).  
The existence of these stages greatly complicates the operation of policies in practice. 
Most authorities have not one, but several parallel schemes, applying to different sizes and
locations of property.  Documents are rarely explicit about all the stages, and crucial issues
tend to be left to management; one Chief Officer told me it had taken him two years to work
out how properties were allocated in his district.  But the combined effects of problems at each
stage have been shown, in certain circumstances, to produce a startling cumulation of
disadvantage (see, e.g., Burney, 1967; Smith, Whalley, 1975; English, 1979; Henderson, Karn,
1984; Commission for Racial Equality, 1984; Clapham, Kintrea, 1986).  It would, then, be unwise
to make generalisations from the fact that some authorities have 'points schemes' and others
do not without knowing what rules govern the other stages, and how the use of points is put
into practice in its particular context.  The aim of this paper is less ambitious; it is confined to
an examination of explicit policy, in order to identify the concept of need enshrined in various
schemes.  
Most information is available about the third stage of the allocations process.  Of 312
schemes (a 75% response nationally), there were 66 date order schemes, 30 merit, and 216
points schemes.  The points schemes offer the most detailed basis on which to analyse
practice, though it is important to note that they are not representative; points schemes are
generally speaking better schemes than others, being more open and taking more factors into
account, and are more likely to consider the needs of applicants than date-order schemes are. 
Of the schemes that gave a sufficient amount of detail to make analysis possible, the factors
taken into account by more than ten authorities were as follows.  
Table 1:  Criteria used for allocation in points schemes, 1982
Criteria for allocation No. of authorities %
Overcrowding 196 100
Medical reasons 188  86
Waiting time 164  84
Condition of house 109  56
Shared facilities:
w.c. 139  71
kitchen 113  58
living room 101  51
bathroom  83  42
bath  38  19
water supply  18   9
sink  15   8
hot water supply  12    6
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Lack of facilities
inside w.c. 126  64
hot water 114  58
bathroom  95  48
bath  90  46
internal water supply  83  42
kitchen  77  39
flush toilet  59  30
sink  41  21
cooking facilities  38  19
drying space  23  12
electricity  20  10
heating  16   8
food storage  14   7
Residence in council's area 113  58
Separated families  97  49
Tenure  62  32
Caravans  57  29
Discretionary points  55  28
Accommodation not
   self-contained  55  28
Under-occupation  52  27
Family size  45  23
Child in upstairs flat  41  21
Service tenancies  37  19
Advanced age  35  18
Ex-servicemen  19  10
Court orders  17   9
Unsuitable accommodation  16   8
Location  15   8
Difficulties in travel
to work  14   7
Lack of play space  13   7
Problems with stairs  12   6
This table does not record everything the authorities included in the survey are likely to take
into account, because circumstances like social or medical problems may be considered outside
the normal points scheme.  This information can only be indicative.  
On the face of it, the list is fairly arbitrary.  Few households in Britain now have no flush
toilet or water supply, both of which appear fairly frequently, and many people have problems
with stairs, the area they live in, or inadequate heating, which are rarely taken into account. 
But there are, at the same time, some general patterns which can be identified within the data,
and a number of propositions can be made.
1.  The needs taken into account are influenced by statute, but are not determined by it.
Although there is a statutory duty to consider the needs of applicants, this has always been too
vague for serious enforcement.  Section 113 of the Housing Act 1957 states that local
authorities
'shall secure that in the selection of their tenants a reasonable preference is given to persons
who are occupying insanitary or overcrowded houses, have large families or are living in
unsatisfactory housing conditions, and to persons towards whom they are subject to a duty
under ... the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977.'
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Quite apart from the difficulty of deciding what is a 'reasonable preference', this provision has
little force.  'Overcrowding' is defined in the Act in such terms that it applies to few people; a
couple with ten children might not be overcrowded in a three bedroomed house.  'Insanitary
conditions' is a vague term which may or may not extend beyond housing which is unfit.  And
although a scheme may give priority to large families on paper, this is usually meaningless in
practice; large families require large houses, and the only people with whom they will be in
conflict for those houses are other large families.  If the houses are not there - and very often
councils have relatively few houses of four or more bedrooms - the priority is worthless.  Only
the priority to homeless families has been materially important, though that is due more to the
terms of the 1977 Act, which allows individuals to institute court action,  than to its inclusion
in this provision.  But it is not coincidental that the principal factors commonly taken into
account include overcrowding, sanitary facilities, and the condition of the house.  Local
authorities define needs in terms which, while not identical to those of the statute, are
recognisably similar.  In Scotland, the terms of the Tenants Rights (Scotland) Act 1980, which
proscribed the use of age, residence and income as criteria for allocation, may not have been
universally respected, but they have not been without influence.  (Shelter (Scotland), 1982) 
It indicates that if major changes are to be made in the way in which local authorities assess
needs, statutory provision would be effective - but effective only in part.
2.  Some measures of need reflect the approaches developed to deal with past problems rather
than present issues.
Some policies are simply dated.  A few authorities still give specific points for tuberculosis, an
issue very much more important in housing terms twenty years ago than it is now (though it
should be recognised that the problem has not altogether ceased to exist).  The frequent
inclusion of 'separated families' for points is curious when they have been, since 1977, legally
defined as homeless and entitled to priority rehousing.  
The treatment of overcrowding is probably the outstanding example of an
inappropriate and dated measure being applied to policy - possibly because of its statutory
definition.  The statutory standard of overcrowding was introduced in 1935, and restated in
the 1957 Housing Act; it was still used in 1982 by 41 authorities as the basis for their points
schemes.  It is very restrictive.  The standard discriminates against single parents; little
allowance is made for privacy.  A couple with six children might not be overcrowded in a
two-bedroomed house.  But even if it were to be updated or modified, it is still a fairly crude
measure; it is inherently flawed (Spicker, 1978), and as a general principle, a standard designed
to define the limit of what is tolerable is not necessarily a good indicator of general needs.  Its
continued use reflects both the influence of statute and the legacy of the past.
3.  Some needs are conventionally excluded from consideration.
Conventionally, housing departments are concerned with 'housing need'.  This was formerly
a fairly limited concept: a 1949 report commented that 
'in all but a very few cases, housing need arises from one or more of the following factors:
overcrowding
ill-health
lack of a separate home
other unsatisfactory conditions of an applicant's present accommodation.'  (CHAC,
1949, para. 15)
There is still a tendency in some housing departments to refer to 'need' primarily in terms of
the size and condition of houses: applicants for transfer from the worst council property are
likely to be told that they are satisfactorily housed.  The Cullingworth report attempted to
expand the concept substantially:
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'a person in housing need is simply one who has a need for housing different from that which
he currently occupies'  (CHAC, 1969, p.102);
and argued:
'In our view it is not sufficient that local authorities should give priority to 'housing need' as
measured by objective factors such as overcrowding, sharing and the like.  ... (p.21)
... the assessment of need must take account of two major factors:
(i) what are the present housing conditions of the household?  - space (too little or too
much),; fitness; amenities; design factors; location factors ...; cost; security of tenure ...;
(ii) how well can this household cope with living in these conditions?' (p.38)
This seems to me to represent a fairly widespread understanding of the idea of 'housing need'
in principle.  However, even if this limited concept was taken as the standard, there are factors
within it commonly not taken into account.  Social factors are not universally accepted.  It used
to be the case that few local authorities took the condition of property into account in their
normal schemes, on the basis that housing in bad condition would be dealt with by the
clearance programme.  Currently, hardly any local authorities consider the financial status of
the tenants - despite the basically selective approach which is adopted.  There are one or two
which have income limits (e.g. Croydon and Maidenhead), but they are few and far between. 
The Cullingworth report argued as follows:
'Different economic and social situations in which different families live must also be taken into
account.  We are not suggesting that more affluent council tenants should be evicted or that
council housing should be reserved for the poor. ... Our point is simply that in allocating council
houses local authorities should give particular attention to those with incomes which are low
in relation to their needs.'  (CHAC, 1969, p.21)
The basic case for taking money into account is that access to adequate housing in the long
term is primarily determined by financial resources.  Money is, then, a powerful indicator of
need - objective, measurable and relatively easy to identify.  There are strong arguments
against means testing.  In the first place, people's income is likely to change in the future and
that present circumstances are not necessarily the best indicator of need - but one could say
the same about their housing status.  Secondly, means tests are seen as stigmatising.  Thirdly,
housing has become, for many people, a means-tested benefit anyway.  Three quarters of
tenants are on housing benefit, not least because anyone with a greater command of resources
has more to gain by buying under current financial arrangements.  I think these are sound
objections; but they are not so devastating that they explain why means-testing should scarcely
be used at all.
4.  Other things being equal, people deemed to be in greater need are given priority over those
in lesser need.
At first sight, this seems almost too obvious to deserve mention; but it is not an obvious point. 
In a universalist service (like health or education), there is a commitment to help all people in
need, not necessarily to concentrate on those in greatest need.  Even where rationing occurs,
as it does in the rather arbitrary formation of waiting lists in the health service, there is an
attempt to deal with a wide range of needs and not only those which are most pressing.  The
allocation of council housing, by contrast, is essentially a selective procedure.  The reference
to other factors besides need - like residence and waiting time - helps to spread the benefits
to include those whose needs are less, but these criteria for allocation have been widely
attacked in a way that could scarcely be applied to health services.  
The case for selectivity in housing is familiar.  Selectivity can be argued to guarantee a
minimum standard, which no person falls below.  It is egalitarian, in the sense of ensuring
greater equality in the final use of resources.  If needs are seen as absolute, concentration on
those most in need minimises the degree of suffering associated with extreme needs at any
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particular time.  And it can be argued that people in greater need have, on the grounds of
social justice, proportionately greater rights to service than others.  Equally, there are a
number of common arguments against selectivity.  Rights are held by all citizens, not only those
residually in need.  Selectivity leads to residual services, which are likely to be stigmatising, and
poor in quality.  It is also possible to base an argument against selectivity in utility.  In certain
cases, the satisfaction experienced by many people may be increased at the expense of those
in greatest need.  Transfers in council housing are often not made because the effect is to delay
the point at which people will be rehoused from the waiting list.  But the promotion of tenants
through a 'housing ladder' may be used to increase the utility of existing tenants, at the
expense of those on the waiting list who are in 'greater' need.  If this is done in current
practice, it is only done within narrow limits; a transfer will be made for a tenant in less need
than an applicant on the waiting list, on the basis that this still releases a house for someone
else, but it is common to refuse transfers to people who are deemed to be 'satisfactorily'
housed.  
The Housing Services Advisory Group suggests, to my mind a little unhelpfully, that 
'Allocation systems should ensure that priority is given to those in greatest housing need.  ...
However, at the same time it is important to ensure that the scheme caters adequately for
those who, while they may not be in acute housing need, nevertheless look to the authority
to meet their housing requirements.  These two approaches will sometimes conflict.'  (1978,
p.33)
It would be wrong to give the impression that people in greater need always receive greater
priority than those in lesser need.  Other factors than need are considered in the allocation of
housing - in particular, the length of time a person has been registered on the housing list -
which are considered to outweigh need and act to prevent those in need from being housed
too quickly relative to others.  But the justification for this rests in other values - particularly,
concerning the 'fairness' of the list - which are not directly related to need.  In these cases,
other things cannot be considered to be equal.
5.  The needs of individuals are generally more relevant to the allocation of housing than the
needs of groups or areas.
During the 1950s, allocations depended to a large extent on clearance programmes, which
emphasised the role of housing as a service to communities rather than one which responded
to the needs of individuals.  Although there are still occasions in which allocations are geared
to the needs of groups - the mass transfer of tenants from council property that is being closed,
provision for key workers bringing employment into an area, or a programme of decanting
people for a modernisation programme - only 12% of allocations nationally fall into these
categories.  Most allocations are now based on the the position of individuals, either through
homelessness (17% of lettings to new tenants) or from the housing list.  
It is perhaps difficult to extend this point beyond the immediate scope of allocations
policy.  The definition of 'needs' used in the assessment of housing requirements for the
purposes of planning are clearly addressed to the problems of the wider community.  Even in
this context, though, there is a tendency to talk about 'needs' as referring to people in common
circumstances (like 'elderly people' or 'single people') rather than the needs of communities
as a whole (like 'environmental quality' or 'economic development').  (See, e.g., HSAG, 1977)
6.  Needs are absolute rather than relative.
This proposition may seem strange when referring to a process in which comparisons are being
made directly between the circumstances of individuals.  But it represents a view of need as
a definable, objective criterion for allocations.  The absolute view of need is taken to mean that
people are either 'in need' or not.  Some councils either reject applications from those not in
need or hold them in permanent abeyance, on a 'deferred list'.  Issues which may look like
needs on a comparative or relative basis - problems like environmental factors or difficulties
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in finding alternatives in the private sector - are not 'needs' in this sense, and are not taken into
account.  Single adults do not 'need' their own room, although this standard is enjoyed by over
95% of the households in Britain; only 7 authorities allow for this in their points schemes.  In
cases where a choice has to be made between people who are not 'in need' in this absolute
sense, it is usual to determine priority on grounds like waiting time or residence.
An argument sometimes used by housing officers against the inclusion of such factors
is that it is not sensible to apply standards which are higher than the local authority is itself
able to meet.  If, for example, councils cannot allow for every single adult to have their own
room - there is just not enough large accommodation to make this possible - then it is not
appropriate to treat it as an indicator of need in a points scheme.  This seems to depend on the
view not only that needs are absolute, but also that when people move into council housing
their needs have been met.  An alternative view is that the aim of rehousing is not necessarily
to meet people's needs in their entirety, but to improve their situation relative to others.  If
a decision has to be made as to whose situation should be improved, then the person or family
in greater need - considered widely - has the greater case.  
7.  Needs which are definable are more legitimate than those which are not.  
Housing departments are probably more responsive to social needs than their published
schemes suggest.  Special projects, like the provision of hostel accommodation for community
care would be taken to committee outside the normal pattern of allocations - it is striking that
few schemes made any explicit mention of needs of this kind, although arguably the emphasis
on this aspect of housing management has increased since the survey was undertaken. 
Individuals may be treated differently from others on the list, either as exceptional cases or
within the limits of the published scheme, because of a desire to take their personal needs into
account.  Having said this, social factors, when they are taken into account, tend to receive a
low weighting relative to other needs, perhaps because it is difficult to deal with them
equitably.  
The emphasis on equity implies consistency, openness and impartiality.  Overcrowding
and the presence of a bath are easily measured, by simple and commonly accepted standards;
the disrepair of housing, physical isolation, or difficulties in travel can be normatively defined,
but they are much more difficult to measure consistently, and occur only infrequently in
allocations schemes.  There is a case to argue that quantifiable factors can be used as indicators
for other circumstances which are not quantifiable.  As the broadest of broad propositions,
most schemes take into account, in one way or another, three major categories: people living
in other people's households, marked by points for tenure, shared amenities, and
overcrowding, as well as by admissions as homeless; people living in bad housing, who have
points for lack of amenities and the condition of the house; and people with personal
problems, who receive medical or social points.  Conditions which appear to receive little
attention, like tenure, may be taken into account in ways that are not obvious: a family living
with parents will probably receive points for 'shared facilities'; the lack of essential facilities
may serve in some areas as an indicator of other problems with the house; waiting time, in an
area where many people are waiting in similar conditions, could be argued to approximate for
length of time in need; problems like coping with stairs or coping with property, which on the
face of it are taken into account very infrequently, may be treated as 'medical' problems.      
Medical needs, of course,  have to be defined by doctors in order to be accepted as
legitimate - even though it is arguable whether a medical assessment is as relevant to a housing
problem as a functional assessment of the type made by occupational therapists.  Problems
which may cause stress are however likely to be considered more important than a medical
assessment of stress itself.  In the authority where I worked, we had a general instruction not
to refer cases of 'nerves' to the Community Physician.  Basically, the question was whether one
could fairly give priority to someone who got upset about their squalid conditions over
someone who didn't.  
8.  Actual needs are more important than potential needs.
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This implies that cure takes priority over prevention.  A family which is living with parents or
friends is likely to become homeless, but this receives less emphasis in many schemes than the
number of bedrooms available to a family while it is on the waiting list.  People who live in
damp housing are less likely to receive consideration for this, despite the evident risk to health,
than a person who has to use an outside toilet.  This has implications for Social Services
recommendations: a social worker concerned with a family 'at risk' is unlikely to receive a
sympathetic hearing for a problem which cannot be proved to exist.
9.  Present needs are more important than past needs.
A person who has been through a series of unsatisfactory dwellings and who is now in
apparently satisfactory accommodation usually receives no consideration for a history of
housing problems.  A family which for example was living with parents and then took the
opportunity to buy a house in poor condition may find not just that their priority is reduced,
but sometimes even that they are removed from the list for becoming owner-occupiers.  There
may, of course, be a past history of ill-health or stress, but this is not taken into account in
most schemes.  The combination of this point and the last creates particular difficulties for
applicants who move house frequently; they will not be considered, despite a long history of
mobility and insecurity, if their present accommodation appears to be satisfactory.
10.  Local authorities have to retain a degree of 'flexibility' to be responsive to needs.
This contradicts the tenor of most of the other propositions on this list.  Flexibility is difficult
to reconcile with equity; it has the effect of reducing the consistency, and to some degree the
impartiality and openness of decisions.  However, the limitations imposed by the other criteria
make it necessary.  The emphasis has clearly fallen on needs that are objective, that can be
seen, measured and packaged in an acceptable manner.  But many people's problems fall
outside the narrow range of needs taken into account.  It is possible to allow for these people
in a number of ways.  One approach is to use established policies only as guidelines.  This was
widely favoured until fairly recently: a Housing Centre Trust seminar in 1977 agreed that points
schemes 
'must be used to bring to the top those in most urgent need, but were at best only a rough
sieve'.  (Housing Review, 1977)
This clearly leaves a great deal of discretion to officials.  It is difficult to deal with such
circumstances equitably, and breaches of published rules are likely to be seen as unfair or
corrupt.  A second approach, which I believe is now more common in formal terms if not
informally, is to treat difficult cases deliberately as 'exceptional'.  This is a flexible procedure,
but it also creates difficulties.  If the circumstances are not extreme enough clearly to merit
rehousing, an applicant in moderate need is unlikely ever to be rehoused.  This procedure, like
the first, is open to abuse - political pressure or patronage.  A third alternative is to allow for
a limited degree of flexibility, through the use of 'discretionary' or 'social' points.  Although this
is used by a number of authorities, the weighting of these points is restricted.  Much the same
objections can be made to 'discretionary' points as to 'discretionary' allocations - with the
added disadvantage that they are often insufficient to make discretionary allocations
unnecessary.  The purpose they really serve is to legitimise the use of discretion by housing
staff within formal limits.  
A fourth approach, and the one which I personally favour, is to make a scheme as
comprehensive as possible.  The extent of discretion is defined by the limit of the rules which
are being applied; the case for 'flexibility' is that the rules are inadequate.  No scheme can be
completely comprehensive, but schemes could take into account many more factors than they
do at present.  If rules are considered inadequate as they stand, they should be changed to be
more adequate.  Less than a tenth of authorities take into account, for example, heating,
environmental problems, needs for employment, problems with stairs, location, or difficulties
in obtaining suitable alternatives in the private market locally.  There are two basic objections
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to inclusions of this type.  One is the problem of explaining a complex scheme to applicants. 
From my own experience, of converting a scheme effectively based on merit to a very detailed
points scheme, I believe this is misconceived.  Although a detailed scheme may look
incomprehensible when presented in full, it is possible to go through it with an applicant and
mark out which section applies.  The other is the administrative burden of taking additional
factors into account.  In practice, this is exaggerated; the procedures for doing the work - taking
statements from applicants, visiting them, and examining cases before allocation - generally
exist anyway.  It is much more difficult and time-consuming to try to explain to an applicant
why important factors in his or her own situation are not being taken into account, or for that
matter the criteria on which allocations have been made to others, even in general terms.   
An ideology of need
The case has been made, in the context of Social Services Departments, that common practices
reflect an 'ideology' of need - an 'ideology' in the sense, not of a system of beliefs about the
world, but of a structured set of concepts and values.  Gilbert Smith writes:
'"Need", as used by welfare professionals, is not simply a single concept but rather a set of
interrelated notions and assumptions about what is to be viewed as the proper object of social
work activity.  It is helpful to view this body of ideas in terms of a professional "ideology" about
the nature of need.'  (1980, p.112)
There is, I think, evidence here to suggest that Housing Departments equally have their own
ideology of need.  An example of this is the apparent general acceptance of the case against
means-testing.  The arguments against means-testing are important ones, but it is surprising
that they seem to have been quite so strong in determining the policies adopted for housing
allocation, because they seem to contradict many of the general propositions that have been
made.  The case against means-testing is part of a 'received wisdom' of housing management.
If there is an ideology of housing management, where does it come from?  One view,
put by Gallagher (1982), is that housing management reflects a 'capitalist' ideology which is
individualistic and seeks to distinguish the 'deserving' poor from the 'undeserving'.  I am not
convinced that an emphasis on 'capitalism' is very helpful; other social services in the same
society have very different ideologies.  Gallagher emphasises the lack of training in housing;
but such training as there has been has tended to reinforce the traditional approach.  The
gospel according to Octavia Hill has been a baneful influence, evident in the way that local
authorities deal with issues like rent arrears or the 'welfare' of tenants (see Spicker, 1985). 
Books like Rowles (1959) or Macey and Baker (1982) have been enormously important, because
they offer at least some guide to officers who otherwise have tended to work in isolation. 
(Their influence rests not only in what they do say, but what they don't.  Macey and Baker's
consideration of a family's 'need', for example, is considered almost wholly in terms of housing
design.)  Practitioners do share views with each other; neighbouring authorities often have
similar schemes (and sometimes even similar wording in their documentation).  Government
publications seem as much to reflect the opinions of practitioners as to form them (see, e.g.,
HSAG, 1978).
Although this helps to explain the process by which ideas are disseminated within the
profession, it does not explain why some ideas should form part of the ideology of housing
management, and others should not.  One of the striking things about local housing policies,
as Gallagher notes, is that 
'Problems are defined bureaucratically and the reponse is management-oriented.'  (1982,
p.132)
Some policies, Lewis suggests, simply "emerge" (1976).  This is to say that they are formed
through practice.  Many housing departments face similar pressures, and they respond with
similar policies as a result.  
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An excellent example of this is the grading of tenants.  Macey and Baker recommend
that 
'the personal suitability of the applicant and his wife are a guide to the type of dwelling to be
offered' (Macey, 1982, p.313).  
In part, this reflects the tradition of Octavia Hill in housing management.  But it is difficult to
explain the practice in these terms alone; there are many other policies which have been
recommended by writers and practitioners (like the removal of residential qualifications) which
have had little influence by comparison.  Grading should not be seen as something imposed
on housing departments externally.  The problem is that tenants resist any attempt to house
'unsuitable' applicants near them.  Applicants are often insulted by the offer of property in a
'bad area' and are not prepared to be housed near certain 'types' of people.  So, if the housing
officer wants to let the houses and to avoid problems in the future, the line of least resistance
is to try to match people to the properties they will accept, and to find someone somewhere
who will take the worst property.  This implies some form of grading.  The Cullingworth report
found that grading of tenants was most prevalent where the housing stock was most varied,
but was unable to explain the phenomenon.  The answer is quite simple: the more
differentiated the stock is, the more anxious tenants and applicants are to avoid 'bad' areas,
and tenants and managers are to preserve 'good' ones.  Officers who grade are responding to
their circumstances.  Practice is reinforced by a set of norms; the norms, equally, are
strengthened by reference to practice.  
The definition of need in allocations policies seems to me to reflect a process of a
similar sort.  The norms have not been formed in isolation; they are a response to a variety of
pressures which many housing departments share.  The allocation of council housing is a form
of rationing, in which housing officers seek to match supply and effective demand.  The main
determinant of allocations is the stock which the housing officers have to let.  Niner (1975)
found that the format of the policy used made little apparent difference to the people who
were being housed; as a general rule, young families would be housed relatively rapidly, and
single people and pensioners much more slowly.  This reflects the available stock.  Many
councils have a preponderance of two and three bedroomed houses, which are classified as
'family' accommodation, and a limited supply of either large housing of four bedrooms and
above, or of one-bedroomed accommodation considered suitable for single persons.  Needs
are defined in terms of what is conventionally provided.  So, for example, one may hear that
"two-thirds of the list require one bedroom accommodation" (the words are those of a senior
housing official in Birmingham), when the 'requirement' is defined by the practice of the
council, not by the expressed need or choices of applicants for housing.  There is scope to treat
the stock more flexibly - for example, by using three-bedroomed accommodation for single
people sharing, as occurs in the private sector - but this is rarely done, because of the problems
it presents in management.
The demands of stock management play an important part in the process of allocation. 
The aim is to match tenants to houses.  Delays in allocations are unacceptable, both because
of the costs of leaving houses unoccupied (or 'void') in lost rent and the potential for damage,
and because it is politically not acceptable to have vacant houses while people are waiting. 
One pressure on housing managers is to allocate with the maximum efficiency.  An allocations
policy which is believed to be simple to administer, like a queue or 'date-order' system, may
be favoured over one which gives some priority to people in need.  
Equally, there are pressures from neighbours and managers who want to defend settled
housing estates.  Existing tenants who want to improve their circumstances call for transfer. 
There may be political pressures from community groups or elected representatives. 
Residential qualifications are used to favour existing constituents over 'outsiders' from outside
the district.  The sons and daughters of existing tenants may have priority over newcomers,
either explicitly as in Kensington and Chelsea's scheme, or implicitly in terms of their relative
priority compared to those occupying houses in the private sector.  The political pressure for
equity creates a demand for consistency, which in turn creates an emphasis on objective,
measurable need.  
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Most of the propositions above can be seen as attempts to come to terms with
conflicting pressures in a situation in which housing officers have only a limited scope for
manouevre.  They cannot be explained solely in these terms; the constraints of statute, and
the patterns learned in former practice, have had an appreciable effect.  But in many ways, the
ideology that is accepted is based in an adjustment of principle to practical necessity.  The
movement from mass schemes to dealing with vacancies as they arise has prompted the
emphasis on finding individual tenants to go into the properties.  The limited resources
available to lettings sections mean that administration cannot be too complex; so authorities
are more likely to favour simple schemes, and where need is taken into account, it is done at
a level which is basic and easy to calculate - which past needs, potential needs, social needs,
and relative needs are not.  (Some housing officers may protest that it is the applicants and
councillors who want simple schemes, like date-order, which they understand and believe to
be fair.  This seems to me to be an  unsubstantiated piece of folk wisdom.  The Welsh
Consumer Council (1976), surveying the attitudes of applicants, found no evidence that simple
date-order schemes were thought to be fair in practice, and some to the contrary.)  The
pressure to let houses swiftly and efficiently means that priorities have to be established; these
priorities do not have to be precise, but sufficient to throw up enough likely tenants for
properties to be let.  'Flexibility' is considered necessary to retain both the responsiveness to
pressure which can smooth conflicts, and the degree of discretion officers want for their own
satisfaction to exercise.  
This may seem unduly cynical, which is not the intention.  The point is that housing
officers could not reasonably adopt norms which fly in the face of the conditions they actually
have to work with.  It is all very well to say that stress, vulnerability or potential risk should be
taken into account, but one has to work out how.  There may be little point in making a
sophisticated analysis of need if there are no houses to let.  (It is also important to remember
that need is not the only factor relevant to lettings; issues like rights and fairness also matter.)
The concept of 'need' that emerges from this discussion is not simply one that is defined
normatively, by professionals - but nor is it defined by a combination of professionals,
politicians, and the users of the service.  In the terms of the economists, the conditions of
supply provide the framework within which demand is expressed.  The essential point is made
by Rein.  It is not always the case that concepts and ideals determine the way in which a service
operates; it is just as likely that norms in policy are shaped by administrative structures and the
conditions in which a service works.  (Rein, 1983) 
This implies, perhaps, that we have been asking the wrong questions.  The problem is
not that 'need' is difficult to operationalise; in the context of the social services, it is used as
an operational concept.  Every need is a need for something.  The definition of 'need'
recognises a claim; and a person who expresses a 'need' is making a claim on others.  If it has
been difficult to translate generalised discussions of need into operational terms, it is because
they have been abstracted from the circumstances in which needs are defined.  
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